DECLASSIFIED

TUESDAY
AUGUST 17, 1954

We breakfasted with Red Dowling, then went to the office where we met Jim Conant, who had returned to Bonn this morning.

After a preliminary talk, we called on the Chancellor. He said the French Protocol was unacceptable to him on so many counts he would prefer not to discuss it in detail. He launched on a disquisition of the importance of a European policy which would firmly tie the Federal Republic into the complex of the free world. It was eloquent and convincing. We discussed this and kindred matters for a couple of hours. I suggested to the Chancellor that the most important preliminary to any detailed exchange of views between the six Foreign Ministers at Brussels would be to obtain from Mendès a statement as to whether he interpreted the French Protocol, if accepted by all concerned, as requiring resubmission to the Parliaments that had already ratified the Treaty. He agreed with this.

There were other procedural matters with which we were all in accord.

He asked me to say to Beyen and Spaak that he would prefer not to be the first speaker after Mendès-France on the first day of the Conference. He felt it was important he remain in the background as much as possible, and certainly during the initial stages. He thought, since Spaak would be Chairman, it might be best to have Beyen open the proceedings for the ratifying powers.

Dowling undertook to report what had been discussed, and did so in this telegram:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY CRL DATE 7-1-81 R
PD☐ or XDS☐ EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED☐ RELEASABLE☐
RELEASE DENIED☐
FR or FOI EXEMPTIONS

"SENT: SECSTATE 504.

"FOR MERCHANT.

"LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

"Bruce and I called on Chancellor this morning to obtain his views on French proposals for Brussels meeting. Blank and Hallstein also present.

"Chancellor began by saying he wished to speak openly and frankly, and trust to our discretion. He said he was aware of rumors that he was personally hostile

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to Mendès-France. These he wished to refute; he did not know Mendès-France, and had never had prejudice for or against any French premier; the only thing that mattered was EDC itself. He reminded us that while he was aware Paris London and Washington were better informed on Sov moves than Bonn, Germany was close to Sov-bloc and therefore Germans were particularly sensitive to Sov moves. For this reason, he and all Germans were increasingly anxious re train of events since May last year. He referred then to various manifestations of Western disunity, saying it was evident this disunity had weakened U.S. leadership while tending to make Sov policy more aggressive. As evidence of the situation in Germany, he pointed out that in October last year, public opinion polls showed 63 percent support for his policy, whereas figure today was no higher than 50 percent. Since SPD support had remained fairly constant in this period, he interpreted shift away from his policy as indicating developing acquiescence in necessity for Germany to get along with Sov Union.

"Turning then to French proposals, he posed question of their impact on German opinion in light situation outlined above. He recalled that EDC as originally conceived was primarily component of overall European integration, providing as it does for supranational authority, non-discrimination and 50 years duration to ensure that its ideas would carry over to next generation. Present French proposals undermined all these concepts, and his inference was that German opinion would view proposals as deliberate sabotage of European unity. (Parenthetically, he recalled that German friend of Mendès-France had commented latter's intimate advisers included two and one-half Communists, i.e., two Communists and one who had left party only 18 months ago, and implied that German opinion was already dubious re Mendès-France's intentions concerning future of Germany.)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

"Continuing, Adenauer explained that of 65 points raised by French proposals, 47 were of nature requiring resubmission to Bundestag, and of these 47, some 20 would need 2/3 majority. He was convinced Bundestag would not accept these modifications, and it would be necessary therefore for him to make clear to Mendès-France at Brussels that Federal Republic could not consider any modifications which would require re-ratification. He added that there were a few points in French proposals which he might be able to accept, and he was prepared to discuss these items at Brussels.

"As authorized Deptel 441, Bruce and I then explained U.S. attitude towards French proposals. Adenauer, obviously encouraged by U.S. position, expressed hope both U.S. and U.K. would make views clear to Mendès-France. He said that at Brussels he felt it essential to avoid debate becoming Franco-German dispute, and that the Benelux countries must therefore take the lead in opposing the French proposals. After discussion of French parliamentary situation, Chancellor expressed conviction that if French Assembly could be brought to realization that unless France ratified EDC, it would be isolated, then he was confident it would act favorably. France, he said, could afford to be isolated from Germany, from Benelux and from Italy, but not from U.S. and U.K.

"I took occasion also to inform Chancellor of Dept's views re Mendès-France's thinking on four-power meeting. CONANT."

We also sent off the following telegram:

"SENT DEPT _____.

"FOR MERCHANT FROM CONANT.

"Saw Chanc this morning with Bruce, as reported separately. Assume Brussels Conf will reject any changes EDC Treaty which would require resubmission to

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Parls. If Mendès-France returns to Paris with intent of putting through EDC Treaty without modification, then issue before FR Chamber would be clear. Is there not a danger, however, that he either consciously or unconsciously will present matter in such way that FR Assembly may pass EDC Treaty with amendments which would require resubmission to other Parls? Such action by FR Assembly would create long delay and continued uncertainty and therefore is matter of concern to US because we are so actively participating in defense of Europe. I would recommend that US and UK jointly notify Mendès-France that passage of EDC Treaty with reservations or amendments requiring resubmission to other Parls would be considered by US and UK as tantamount to rejection. If FR Assembly rejects Treaty or passes it with crippling amendments, then US and UK would ask for immediate mtg of FonMins of EDC countries which have ratified together with Fon Secys US and UK not later than Oct. 1 to consider situation thus created in respect to sovereignty of Germany and defense of Europe. It might well be such a mtg would refer its conclusions with recommendations to emergency session of NATO Council. But importance of this mtg would be to demonstrate isolation of France and FR should not be asked even as observers. CONANT."

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Tommy and I motored to Dusseldorf, a trip of about two hours, and caught a KIM plane there to Amsterdam. Doc Matthews being away for the day on his boat, Andy Ronhovde, the Counselor, met us at the airport and we went straight to Beyen's house. There we found Lee Van Starkenborgh. I told Beyen about my conversation with the Chancellor and what Adenauer had requested in the way of procedure. He said this was agreeable to him. The Dutch Government has already issued an official statement of opposition to the French Protocol. He said the feeling in Holland was very adverse to this tricky French proposal, and he had today been unanimously instructed by the Foreign Affairs Committees of the two Houses of Parliaments, which Committees contain many opponents of the EDC, to reject the Protocol.

Beyen said he knew Mendès-France extremely well --- they had been colleagues for a year at the International Bank, and he had seen him often at Bretton Woods. He regards him as brilliant and courageous, but cannot conceive how he has been so misguided as to lend his name and sponsorship to a Protocol which is bad, indeed evil in content, particularly as to some of its implications, and ill-drafted, to say nothing of the fact that it evidences an insolence on the part of the French Government toward its EDC partners..

Tommy and I had dinner about midnight at the comfortable Hotel Witteburg, where we spent the night.

DECLASSIFIED